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ABSTRACT
Online Automated Privacy Policy Generators (APPGs) are tools
used by app developers to quickly create app privacy policies which
are required by privacy regulations to be incorporated to each mo-
bile app. e creation of these tools brings convenience to app
developers; however, the quality of these tools puts developers and
stakeholders at legal risk. In this paper, we conduct an empirical
study to assess the quality of online APPGs. We analyze the com-
pleteness of privacy policies, determine what categories and items
should be covered in a complete privacy policy, and conduct APPG
assessment with boilerplate apps. e results of assessment show
that due to the lack of static or dynamic analysis of app’s behavior,
developers may encounter two types of issues caused by APPGs.
First, the generated policies could be incomplete because they do
not cover all the essential items required by a privacy policy. Sec-
ond, some generated privacy policies contain unnecessary personal
information collection or arbitrary commitments inconsistent with
user input. Ultimately, the defects of APPGs may potentially lead to
serious legal issues. We hope that the results and insights developed
in this paper can motivate the healthy and ethical development of
APPGs towards generating a more complete, accurate, and robust
privacy policy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Mobile phones have become increasingly important to our daily
lives. Information privacy issues are of growing concern to develop-
ers as well as to mobile app users. Nowadays, it is very common that
a mobile app accesses, requires, or transmits users’ sensitive per-
sonal information when requesting services. Privacy policy is one
of the key legal statements that is used to protect users’ personal
information. Many countries have adopted privacy regulations,
such as the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) [1],
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA) [17],
the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [8], and
the California Online Privacy Protection Act (CalOPPA) [2]. ese
regulations restrict the behavior of apps and dene the obligations
of app developers. One of the main requirements of these privacy
regulations is that a privacy policy is mandatory for an app. For
example, the Article 13.1(c) of GDPR requires that the use of a data
subject’s personal data should have a legal basis. e Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) also recommended that app developers should
ensure easy access to the privacy policy through app stores. How-
ever, not every app developer is a legal professional and writing
privacy policies could be a time-consuming and tedious task [4].
e emergence of APPGs greatly eases such dilemma. For com-
panies small in size or individual developers who cannot aord
the expense of legal fees, an APPG online could be a good option,
which can quickly create a customized privacy policy with basic or
perhaps reliable terms.
e ease of APPGs comes at a cost of legal risk. FTC severely
penalizes companies for breach of commitments in their privacy
policies [19]. Failing to provide a correct privacy policy may cause
serious legal issues. For example, InMobi, a Singapore-based mobile
advertising company, was ned $950,000 by FTC as it collected
user’s location information without declaring the behaviors in the
privacy policy [6]. In 2014, a company of a popular ashlight app
and its owner were complained by FTC as they did not reect the
app’s use of personal data in app privacy policies. Users of the
APPG may encounter the same legal issue with the APPG per se.
In this paper, we make several key contributions listed below.
• To assess privacy practices of online APPGs, we analyzed
the completeness of privacy policies and determined what
categories and items should be covered in a complete pri-
vacy policy.
• We investigated 10 popular online APPGs and then studied
the complexity of use and payment methods used by them.
We designed three boilerplate apps to generate privacy
policies and used them for APPG quality assessment. Our
method assesses the quality of APPGs by combining the as-
pects of completeness of privacy policy and the consistency
with user input.
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• Combined with the results of the quality assessment, we
believe that the quality of free APPGs not signicantly
outperforms that of a well-designed template. We found
that the quality of the paid APPGs largely outperforms the
free APPGs, despite many functional issues arisen.
1.1 Related Work
Privacy policy generation techniques. Recent work has been
proposed to generate privacy policies for apps. For instance, the
AutoPPG [18] conducts static code analysis to extract app behaviors
about user personal information. Based on the extracted behaviors,
AutoPPG applies natural language processing (NLP) techniques to
generate privacy policies.
Mobile app privacy policy. Several works have studied the con-
sistency between privacy policies and app behaviors [11, 15]. Andow
et al. [3] present a state-of-the-art privacy policy analysis tool,
termed PolicyLint. Utilizing sentence-level NLP techniques, Poli-
cyLint is able to detect the positive and negative statements in a
privacy policy, which enables the automated analysis of the contra-
dictions in a privacy policy. Chen et al. [5] analyzed the security risk
of banking apps with NLP and static analysis. Zimmeck et al. [20]
designed a scaling privacy compliance analysis tool through code
analysis and machine learning techniques.
Our work. Because the existing online APPGs rely heavily on user
input and templates, if the quality of APPGs cannot be guaranteed,
the privacy policy they generate may deviate from the terms ex-
pected by users, and inconsistencies with app behaviors may cause
serious legal consequences. is paper dierentiates from previous
works by looking into the quality assessment of APPGs per se in
terms of their completeness and consistency.
2 METHODOLOGY
2.1 Collecting Online APPGs
In order to investigate the current status of APPGs, we identied a
set of popular app privacy policy generators. We rst used Google
search queries, including but not limited to “privacy terms tem-
plate”, “GDPR compliant privacy policy generator”, and “mobile
app privacy policy generator”. For each result, we selected the rst
ten entries, including advertising links provided by Google. We also
collected recommendation of APPGs across forums, blogs [7, 9],
or in the post of the legal consultant website [12]. We remove the
APPGs that cannot generate privacy policies for mobile apps and
select the most popular ones in terms of their stated marketing
scale and user recommendations.
Aer removing duplicates and highly similar sites, we obtained
top 10 popular APPGs listed in Table 1. Although most of them
collect user Privacy Identiable Information (PII), such as mailing
address and email address, or even require nancial information
for service purchasing, only six of them have privacy policies to
protect their customers’ privacy. While APPGs having advertised
their services are being widely used, 40% of them also have dis-
claimers, stating that their services are only pieces of legal advice,
instead of a formal legal service. For example, the APPG #7 listed in
Table 1 claims that they provide “Trusted legal agreement”. How-
ever, they also have a disclaimer stating that, “TermsFeed.com is
not a law rm and is not providing legal advice. All information
Figure 1: e UIs of APPGs. (1) Fill-in spaces in template. (2)
Logo. (3) Progress bar. (4) Multiple choice questions. (5) Paid
features. (6) Text area for user input. (7) Preview of policy.
(including agreements, forms and documents) available on our site,
www.termsfeed.com, are provided without any warranty, express
or implied”. Furthermore, for other APPGs, there is no company
information provided, neither on their websites nor in payment
receipts.
Figure 1 shows the user interfaces of typical APPGs. APPGs
in a template form, i.e., #1 and #2, always have ll-in space for
users to input detailed information. e user interface of survey
questionnaire APPGs usually includes a logo, multiple choice ques-
tions with yes or no answers, and a progress bar. Some APPGs
require payments to use advanced features. APPG # 9 improves the
exibility of user input through an editable text area and provides
a preview of the generated privacy policy.
More than half of the APPGs listed in Table 1 are free of charge,
or have a free version with limited functionalities, e.g., no GDPR
compliant or can only generate one privacy policy. For the three
paid APPGs, the user will be charged from $20 to $40 per privacy
policy generated, or paid per item added into policy, e.g., $14 for
business using, $9 for terms related to location information col-
lection, $14 for involving Google Analytics, which can make one
privacy policy costs exceed $180.
2.2 Completeness Analysis of Privacy Policies
As required in GDPR and other privacy regulations, apps must
have a privacy policy to explicitly inform what kind of data is
collected from users and how data is handled. Related works [10, 16]
also argue that a complete app privacy policy should include the
following categories:
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Table 1: Overview of online APPGs
# APPG Company Location Payment Has Privacy Policy? Has Disclaimer?
1 seqlegal.com SEQ Legal LLP Oxfordshire, UK Free No No
2 volusion.com Volusion Austin, USA Free Yes No
3 app-privacy-policy-
generator.rebaseapp.com
Individual N/A Free No No
4 getterms.io Humaan Perth, Australia Free Yes Yes
5 privacypolicygenerator.info N/A N/A Free No Yes
6 legenova.com Legal Nova Ltd Soa, Bulgaria Free Yes No
7 termsfeed.com N/A N/A Paid Yes No
8 websitepolicies.com WebsitePolicies Inc. Toronto, Canada Paid Yes Yes
9 wonder.legal Miracle Paris, France Paid No No
10 termly.io Termly LTD London, UK Free/Period Yes Yes
• The basic information, which includes the identity of
data collector, e.g., the name of the company, email address,
and location of the company, the name of the app, and the
date of version.
• The personal information to be collected, which in-
cludes PII and non-PII. As per the guide of PII protection
by McCallister [13], the PII includes the name of a user,
email address, IP address, location information, etc. How-
ever, due to the constant evolution of technologies, PII and
non-PII may change and overlap. us, we also consider
non-PII information collected by apps, e.g., the content cre-
ated by users in apps, device information, and information
collected from any third parties.
• Why and how the data are to be used, which includes
the purpose of data access, the identity of third parties, and
whether the data will be disclosed as a response to legal
requests.
• Information management, which includes the descrip-
tion of user rights, data transfers, the practice of data pro-
tection, the retention of data, the notication of change
to privacy policies, whether the data will be shared in the
case of business merges and acquisitions, and asset sales,
and the protection of children’s data.
Several most popular apps, e.g., Facebook, Google Calendar, Pok-
mon Go, Clash of Clans, Tik-tok, EBay, and Runtastic, were ana-
lyzed in this paper. Based on the data from Google Play Store, the
downloads of these apps have all exceeded 50 million. Considering
the spread scale and number of users of these apps, we can infer
that their privacy policies are of high quality and minor defects.
rough the completeness analysis on their privacy policies, we
further investigated the categories that should be covered in pri-
vacy policies and determined essential items in each category as
shown in Table 2.
In our investigation, two APPGs (#1 and #2) are in form of tem-
plates. All the remaining APPGs have a survey questionnaire, query-
ing questions from users, and generate privacy policies based on the
user input. Table 3 shows the result of APPG questionnaires. e
symbol indicates that the item is covered by the questionnaire.
As we can see, most APPGs are covered no more than half of the
essential items, indicating two potential defects: 1) for some essen-
tial items, users cannot input any information to the generator; 2)
even if the generated privacy policies cover more items than its
questionnaire does, the descriptions of items are not able to closely
follow user input. For example, APPG #4 does not even request
Table 2: Essential categories and items in privacy policies
Categories Items
Basic information Name of company, Address of company, Name of app,
Contact info, and Date of last version.
Privacy Informa-
tion Collected
Name of user, Email address, Phone number, User-
name/Account ID, IP address, Location information, Pur-
chasing information, Content created by user, Informa-
tion from third-parties, Device information, User activ-
ity, and Cookies.
Use of Informa-
tion
For detecting abuse and illegal activity, For safety and
security, For services improving, For service providing,
Personalised advertising, Business analysis, Communi-
cation with users, Sharing with other users, Sharing
with third-party, and Respond to legal requests.
Information Man-
agement
User rights, Data transfers, Protection of data, Data re-
tention, Changes notifying, Business Transactions, Age.
and Limits/Children’s privacy
which privacy information will be collected, but directly writes,
“we only ask for personal information when we truly need it to
provide a service to you. We collect it by fair and lawful means,
with your knowledge and consent,” in the generated privacy policy.
We also counted how many questions in each survey question-
naire of APPGs. Two template-typed APPGs have few questions;
however, the most complex APPG has 45 questions for users to
answer, and it may take roughly an hour to generate one privacy
policy.
2.3 Designing Boilerplate Apps
To further assess the quality of APPGs, we designed boilerplate apps
to simulate the privacy policy generation process. For each APPG,
we generated privacy policies based on the wording of the three
same boilerplate apps to evaluate whether the generated privacy
policy is covered by essential items and whether the generated
terms are aligned with user input.
• App 1: e rst app only collects the full name of the user
which is visible on the screen. is app will only disclose
user information in the case of legal request.
• App 2: A game app utilizing augmented reality technology
collects user’s location information. Users need to register
an account to login the game app, which collects users
name and email address. Users are able to login with a third-
party account, such as a Google account or a Facebook
account. Users can purchase virtual items in-app through
a third-party payment processor. e design of this app
comes from the popular game Pokmon Go.
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Table 3: Categories and items covered in APPG question-
naires (# APPG is referred to the rst column of Table 1)
# APPG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Basic information
Name of company
Address of company
Name of App
Contact info
Date of last version
Privacy Information Collected
Name of user
Email Address
Phone
Username/Account ID
IP address
Location information
Purchase information
In-App sharing
Content created by user
Information from third-parties
Device information
User activity
Cookie data
Others
Use of Information
Detect abuse and illegal activity
Safety and security
Improve products/services
For service providing
Personalised advertising
Business analysis
Communication with users
Sharing of information
Sharing with other users
Sharing with third-party
Respond to legal requests
Information Management
User rights
Data transfers
Protection of data
Data retention
Changes notifying
Business Transactions
Age limits/Children’s privacy
Number ofestions 0 2 4 4 6 13 20 30 45 45
• App 3: e third app is an social app which enables users
interaction and communication with each other. Users
can create contents and share them publicly in-app. Users
need to register an account to login the social app. e
registration process collects users personal information,
such as name, email address, phone number. e app also
utilizes cookies data for updating services.
Table 4 lists all the categories and items that could be incorpo-
rated in the generated privacy policies. We dened a three-level
criticality of items in an app: Not related, Recommended, and Essen-
tial. Not related means that the item is unnecessary to be explicitly
mentioned in the privacy policy. For example, App 1 does not ex-
ploit user information for safety and security purpose, regardless
of the reference, we give the corresponding item 0 score; Recom-
mended means that the item is not critical; however, an incorrect
description may cause potential inconsistency and legal issues; Es-
sential items should be exactly described in the privacy policy as
per user input and inconsistent description may cause serious legal
issues. For example, App 3 collects email address from users, and
this must be described consistently in the generated privacy policy.
Table 4: Design of dummy apps
Identity of Data Collector App 1 App 2 App 3
Name of company
Address of company
Name of App
Contact info
Date of last version
Information Collection App 1 App 2 App 3
Name of user
Email Address
Phone
Username/Account ID
IP address
Location information
Purchase information
In-App sharing
Content created by user
Information from third-parties
Device information
User activity
Cookie data
Others
Use of Information App 1 App 2 App 3
Detect abuse and illegal activity
Safety and security
Improve products/services
For service providing
Personalised advertising
Business analysis
Communication with users
Information Disclosure App 1 App 2 App 3
Sharing with other users
Sharing with third-party
Respond to legal requests
Information Management App 1 App 2 App 3
User rights
Data transfers
Protection of data
Data retention
Changes notifying
Business Transactions
Age limits/Children’s privacy
: Not related : Recommended : Essential
2.4 ality Assessment of APPGs
Based on the criticality level of items for each boilerplate app, we
evaluate the quality of generated privacy policies. e rules of eval-
uation are described in Table 5. If the description exactly matches
the user input, we will give a high score to the item; otherwise, a
negative penalty score will be given. Considering there are many
descriptions generated based on templates, which may be still cor-
rect but not exactly be consistent with the user input, we will assign
a positive but a lower score. For example, whatever the user input is
for a policy generated by APPG #2, it always has the sentence “we
value your trust in providing us your Personal Information, thus
we are striving to use commercially acceptable means of protecting
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Table 5: e rules of APPG performance evaluation
Criticality of Items Consistency with User Input Score
Not related N/A 0
Essential Exactly consistent 5
Not exactly consistent 3
Inconsistent -5
Recommended Exactly consistent 3
Not exactly consistent 1
Inconsistent -3
it.” We will only give score 1 for such blur description as this may
lead to potential inconsistency and increase risks to developers and
app users.
Using this method, we cannot only evaluate the completeness
of a generated privacy policy, but also assess the APPG quality
based on whether the terms match the user input. A higher score
indicates beer performance of an APPG and a lower score indicates
that there are more inconsistencies with user inputs or more terms
generated by templates.
We also measure the similarity between generated privacy poli-
cies and the original privacy policies of boilerplate apps, i.e., privacy
policies from Facebook and Niantic.1 We rst store privacy policies
into text les, then convert all uppercase characters into lowercase
and remove all punctuation marks. We compute the TF-IDF [14]
values for each word in privacy policies, where the word weighting
is encoded by Equation (1) as follows.
wi, j = t f i, j · log
(
N
d fi
)
, (1)
wherewi, j is the weight for word i in policy j , t fi, j is the frequency
of word i in policy j , N is the number of documents in the collection,
and d fi is the document frequency of word i in the collection. Aer
applying TF-IDF analysis, we obtained a weight vector for each
word in the privacy policy, where a high value indicates a high
weight of this word in that policy.
Cosine similarity is oen used as an indicator of similarity be-
tween two documents. We applied this method according to Equa-
tion (2) to measure the similarity between the generated privacy
policy and its original policy.
cosine similarity =
Vд ·VoVд · ‖Vo ‖ , (2)
where Vд is the TF-IDF weight vector of generated privacy policy,
Vo is the weight vector of original privacy policy. Because we design
the functionalities of the boilerplate apps based on the original apps,
a highly weighted word in the original privacy policy should also
be weighted highly in the generated privacy policy. Hence, a high
similarity rate indicates a high-quality APPG.
3 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
To analyze the quality of APPGs, we generated 30 privacy policies
with 3 boilerplate apps and 10 APPGs. Figure 2 shows the quality
assessment results of these privacy policies. e scores are scaled
into [−100, 100] for comparison. e t-test applied on free and
paid app scores indicates that there is signicant dierence in the
performance of free and paid APPGs (see ndings in detail below).
1Niantic (hps://nianticlabs.com) is a world’s leading augmented reality game com-
pany, the developer of Pokmon Go.
Figure 2: e performance scores of APPGs evaluated by
dummy apps.
Finding 1. e versatility of template is limited. We can see that,
for APPGs #1–#4, the assessment results of the three boilerplate
apps are dierent, because they are in the form of templates or rely
heavily on templates to generate privacy policies. e functions of
apps are dierent from each other, so their scores change drastically.
One template may generate a good quality privacy policy for a
specic app, but it may perform poorly when being applied to
another app. For example, APPG #1 always generates a term that
the app will not collect personal information from third parties.
is is good enough for App 1, but it fails to match App 2 and App 3.
e result shows that it is not a good solution to apply one template
to all apps.
Finding 2. Some APPGs generate over-scoped terms. For APPGs #6,
#7, and #9, the scores generally increase with the complexity of
the boilerplate apps. is is mainly because the APPGs generate
some personal information terms which are over-scoped of the
ground truth that user inputs. For example, whatever the user
input is, APPG #6 will, by default, generate terms to collect personal
information, e.g., email address, IP address, location information,
which is heavily penalized for App 1 in our quality assessment.
As shown in Figure 3, we calculated the average quality score of
each APPG and measure the similarity between generated privacy
policies and the original ones. e scores of templates, free, and
paid APPGs are marked as yellow, green, and blue, respectively. e
red line represents the complexity of questionnaires encoded by
the number of questions. e dashed line represents the similarity
results.
Finding 3. Keeping generated terms consistent with user input and
ensuring the coverage rate of essential items is critical to high-quality
policy generation. e performance of APPGs mostly increases
with the complexity of the questionnaire. However, for APPGs #8
and #9, despite more complex questionnaires, their performance
is lower than APPG #7, which indicates that more complex survey
questionnaires do not necessarily perform beer. To achieve high
quality, APPGs should consider more essential items in the design
of questionnaires so as to ensure that a complete privacy policy
is generated. In addition, users should be allowed to answer ques-
tions in a more exible way, as some questions require users to
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Figure 3: e performance of APPGs vs. complexity of ques-
tionnaire and similarity to original policies.
provide more specic information rather than simply answering
multiple choice questions; otherwise, the terms generated may not
be consistent with the actual behavior of the app. For example,
although APPG #8 has 30 questions in the survey, it never covers
the item of cookies access and there is no text area for users to input
which personal information will be collected. It will always claim
the collection of device’s IP address, location, and device name,
lowering its quality score.
Finding 4. e similarity score uctuates with the quality assessment
outcome. e dashed line of Figure 3 reects the similarity result of
APPGs. For several APPGs, such as #1, #2, and #6, there are some
gaps between similarity trend and scoring due to the fact that more
penalties are pushed towards the low-quality terms which do not
t into actual user input.
Finding 5. APPG quality is positively correlated to payment. Consid-
ering the payment mode of APPGs shown in Table 1, free APPGs,
such as #3–#6, perform less commendably than a well-designed
template, evidenced by the fact that their quality scores are no
greater than the template APPG #1. APPG #10 is an exception as
it needs to be paid periodically for retrieving advanced features.
Meanwhile, paid APPGs,such as #7–#9, normally have a more com-
plex questionnaire and beer perform than free APPGs.
4 CONCLUSION
We analyzed the privacy policies of popular apps and specied what
categories and items a complete privacy policy should cover. Based
on the essential items of privacy policy, we provide a method to
assess the quality of online APPGs. e assessment results show
that the performance of APPGs largely increases with the com-
plexity of the survey questionnaires. Although there are still many
template-generated terms which are potentially inconsistent with
user’s input, paid APPGs normally outperform free APPGs as a
whole.
Most existing APPGs are in form of survey questionnaires. Even
some APPGs claim that they do not make any templates, the method
they applied is to collect user’s answers and to t them into a “smart”
template. ey only generate privacy policies relied on user’s in-
puts (e.g., answer questions). As lack of static or dynamic code
analysis of apps, while using APPGs, developers and app users may
encounter two types of serious issues. First, the generated policies
could be incomplete because they did not cover all the essential
items required by a privacy policy, e.g., did not include all personal
information collected by the app. Second, some generated policies
may be over-scoped, e.g., they claim to collect personal informa-
tion which is not in fact accessed by the app, and this may lead to
potential inconsistency and legal issues. We strongly recommend
that developers should systematically consult a professional legal
team before releasing a privacy policy generated by APPGs. In
future work, besides extending assessment to more APPGs, we will
further optimize the APPG quality assessment through semantic
analysis, and will conduct a more in-depth assessment as per the
requirements of a specic regulation, e.g., HIPAA or GDPR.
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